Once you start Performance Monitor to monitor handles count, note how many handles the process "dllhost#1" has.
In our scenario, it shows 434 handles. Verify this count in windbg right after you attach by issuing this command:
0:031> !handle
Handle 4
Type Section
Handle 8
Type Event
Handle c
Type Event
.......
434 Handles
Type Count
Event 215
Section 8
File 87
Port 15
Directory 3
Mutant 6
WindowStation 2
Semaphore 20
Key 25
Token 2
Thread 43
Desktop 1
IoCompletion 6
Timer 1
In windbg, type in "g", and back to Internet Explorer, keep pressing "Handle Leak" button. (or just paste the URL that causes the leak in a new
IE window and keep pressing F5). This is the URL "http://localhost/badext.dll?s=handleleak1_v1"
Now performance Monitor shows 717 handles open. Back to Windbg, press "Ctrl_break" and run the "!handle" command again.
Here is the output
In Windbg
0:031> !handle
Handle 4
Type Section
Handle 8
Type Event
Handle c
Type Event
.......
717 Handles
Type Count
Event 217
Section 8
File 87
Port 16
Directory 3
Mutant 6
WindowStation 2
Semaphore 20
Key 304
Token 3
Thread 43
Desktop 1
IoCompletion 6
Timer 1
Based on this, we can see that the handle that we are leaking is a handle to a registry key. the key handle count jumped from 25 to 304.
Issue again the "!handle 0" to include the handle type information in the display
0:031> !handle 0
.........
.........
.........
Handle 650
Name \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\ProductOptions
Handle 654
Name \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\ProductOptions
Handle 658
Name \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\ProductOptions
Handle 65c
Name \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\ProductOptions
Handle 660
Name \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\ProductOptions
Handle 664
Name \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\ProductOptions
Handle 668
Name \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\ProductOptions
.............
.............
.............
So this shows that the handle we are leaking is to he registry key "\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\ProductOptions"
Now let try to see who is leaking the handle to the registry key mentioned above. To do this, we are going to set a break point.
In windbg command line, type in this command:
0:003> bp ADVAPI32!RegOpenKeyExA
This will set a break point in RegOpenKeyExA. When the break point is hit, the debugger breaks.
In Windbg command line, type in "g"
In the browser, click the "Leak Handle" button, and notice that the debugger breaks.
Issue a "kvn50" in the debugger's command line.
Add the symbol path(company wide symbols) as well as private symbols of our dll a) Using the GUI:
- Click "File"
- Click "Symbol File Path"
- Type in SRV*C:\LabSymbols*\\symbols\symbols;C:\IISDebugLabs\symbols\Pri a
nd hit Enter
b) Using the ".sympath+" command:
.sympath+ SRV*C:\LabSymbols*\\symbols\symbols;C :\IISDebugLabs\symbols\Pri
Having the private symbols lined up, here is how the stack would look like:
0:006> kvn50
# ChildEBP RetAddr Args to Child
00 00b3f6f0 012917a5 80000002 0129119c 00000000 ADVAPI32!RegOpenKeyExA (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\windows\screg\winreg\client\regkey.c @ 875]
01 00b3f70c 012914b0 00e02128 00000001 00e021f4 badext!doHandleLeak1+0x21 (CONV: stdcall) [H:\nT\PRIVATE\inet\iis\svcs\w3\gateways\extDBG\badext.cpp @ 337]
02 00b3f728 65d82b06 00e02128 00e021f4 00e02128 badext!HttpExtensionProc+0x18d (CONV: stdcall) [H:\nT\PRIVATE\inet\iis\svcs\w3\gateways\extDBG\badext.cpp @ 124]
03 00b3f73c 65d82a97 00e02128 00e021f4 00e02128 wam!HSE_APPDLL::ExecuteRequest+0x93 (FPO: [1,0,3]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\inet\iis\svcs\wam\object\isplocal.cxx @ 450]
04 00b3f770 65d823a2 0040a8c8 00e0229d 00e02128 wam!WAM::InvokeExtension+0x35 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\inet\iis\svcs\wam\object\wamobj.cxx @ 913]
05 00b3f7b4 77d339c0 00406c08 00000000 000000a6 wam!WAM::ProcessRequest+0x240 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\inet\iis\svcs\wam\object\wamobj.cxx @ 643]
06 00b3f7dc 77d93570 65d8223f 00b3f7f8 00000005 RPCRT4!Invoke+0x30 [..\i386\stubless.asm @ 88]
07 00b3fa54 77d949ac 000c8f78 0009fd94 000b5660 RPCRT4!NdrStubCall2+0x63d (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\ndr20\srvcall.c @ 1724]
08 00b3fab8 77b29e7f 000c8f78 000b5660 0009fd94 RPCRT4!CStdStubBuffer_Invoke+0xec (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\ndr20\stub.c @ 1571]
09 00b3fafc 77b29d6e 000b5660 000c832c 000a25a8 ole32!SyncStubInvoke+0x61 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1136]
0a 00b3fb44 77aa7ae7 000b5660 000c8240 000c8f78 ole32!StubInvoke+0xa8 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1334]
0b 00b3fba8 77aa7a33 0009fd94 00000000 000c8f78 ole32!CCtxComChnl::ContextInvoke+0xbb (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\ctxchnl.cxx @ 1204]
0c 00b3fbc4 77b29c89 000b5660 00000001 000c8f78 ole32!MTAInvoke+0x18 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\callctrl.cxx @ 1952]
0d 00b3fbf4 77b29a89 000b5618 0009fd94 000c8f78 ole32!AppInvoke+0xb5 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1013]
0e 00b3fcb4 77b2a12c 000a1cf8 00000000 000c8310 ole32!ComInvokeWithLockAndIPID+0x29e (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1578]
0f 00b3fcf4 77d33721 000b5618 000c8310 0007a410 ole32!ThreadInvoke+0x1b7 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 3835]
10 00b3fd2c 77d33667 77b29f7b 0007a410 00b3fe0c RPCRT4!DispatchToStubInC+0x84 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\dispatch.c @ 82]
11 00b3fd84 77d33579 00000000 00000000 00b3fe0c RPCRT4!RPC_INTERFACE::DispatchToStubWorker+0x100 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\hndlsvr.cxx @ 543]
12 00b3fda4 77d48e81 0007a410 00000000 00b3fe0c RPCRT4!RPC_INTERFACE::DispatchToStub+0x5e (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\hndlsvr.cxx @ 407]
13 00b3fdd4 77d34bc6 0007a410 0007a3d4 00000000 RPCRT4!RPC_INTERFACE::DispatchToStubWithObject+0xa9 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\hndlsvr.cxx @ 795]
14 00b3fe10 77d346c5 000a4d40 000826a0 80030001 RPCRT4!LRPC_SCALL::DealWithRequestMessage+0x1c6 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\lpcsvr.cxx @ 2665]
15 00b3fe28 77d422ff 0007a318 00b3fe50 000a4d40 RPCRT4!LRPC_ADDRESS::DealWithLRPCRequest+0x10c (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\lpcsvr.cxx @ 867]
16 00b3ff74 77d420d9 77d42528 000826a0 00000000 RPCRT4!LRPC_ADDRESS::ReceiveLotsaCalls+0x1eb (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\lpcsvr.cxx @ 1175]
17 00b3ff78 77d42528 000826a0 00000000 00000000 RPCRT4!RecvLotsaCallsWrapper+0x9 (FPO: [1,0,0]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\lpcsvr.cxx @ 37]
18 00b3ffa8 77d424da 0009d728 00b3ffec 77e887dd RPCRT4!BaseCachedThreadRoutine+0x4f (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\hndlsvr.cxx @ 3586]
19 00b3ffb4 77e887dd 0009ee40 00000000 00000000 RPCRT4!ThreadStartRoutine+0x18 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\threads.cxx @ 230]
1a 00b3ffec 00000000 77d424c2 0009ee40 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadStart+0x52 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\windows\base\client\support.c @ 460]
Let see what registry we are trying to open here:
The 2nd parameter of (ADVAPI32!RegOpenKeyExA ) is actually a pointer to a null teminated string that hold the registry key name.
Dumping that address shows the following:
0:006> da 0129119c
0129119c "SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control"
012911bc "\ProductOptions"
So the handle to this key is actually what we are leaking. From the stack backtrace, you could see that (ADVAPI32!RegOpenKeyExA ) is called from (badext!doHandleLeak1). This is enough to tell teh customer that the
component "badext.dll" is the one causing the handle leak.
Here is how line 337 looks like in "badext.cpp"
DWORD doHandleLeak1(EXTENSION_CONTROL_BLOCK *lpEcb, int Variation)
{
if (1 == Variation)
{
HKEY hKey;
LONG lRet;
lRet = RegOpenKeyEx( HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, "SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\ProductOptions", 0, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, &hKey ); //line 337
}
return HSE_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}