Debug Labs


Access Violation in Component Code

This lab will demonstrate an Access Violation in a component. In this scenarion, an AV in the ISAPI extension "badExt.dll"

 

1- Lab Setup
	

Note: This lab assumes that you have already installed the necessary lab files to run it.

1- Verify the site is running in medium protection

2- Verify that the process "dllhost.exe" mapped to the out of process pooled application is running and note down its PID

To find the PID of the desired dllhost, do the follwing:

- Open Component Services

- Expand "Component Services" Node

- Expand "Computers" Node

- Expand "My Computer" Node

- Select "COM+ Applications"

- Click "Status View" icon and notice the PID column on the right hand pane

3- Attach windbg to the dllhost process with the PID found in step 2

a) Using the GUI:

- Click "File"

- Click "Attach to Process"

- Select "dllhost.exe" with the PID found in step 2 and click "OK"

b) Using the command prompt:

- Switch to thr folder where the debugging tools for windows is installed

- Type in "windbg -p <PID>" and hit Enter

 

4- In windbg command line, type in "g" with no quotation marks and press Enter

 

 

2- Run Scenario

1- Click the "Invoke Extension" button to load the ISAPI Extension in the dllhost process memory space. You should see the ISAPI extension "badExt.dll"among the list of modules loaded in dllhost.exe
2- Click the "AV Extension" button the first time to cause a 1st chance AV in dllhost.exe.
 Note that the debugger breaks and diplays 
	a- Comments about the exception
b- The value of the registers
c- The module where the AV happened
d- The assembly line that caused the AV

					

                                                                           

 

1- Debug Annotation

 

1) Without symbols

 

a) The faulting Stack

 

The stack backtrace of the thread that AV'd would look like:

0:001> kvn

ChildEBP RetAddr Args to Child

WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.

00 00b9f70c 064712df 01c31eb0 00000001 01c31f7c badext!HttpExtensionProc+0x1e3

*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for wam.dll -

01 00b9f728 65d82b06 01c31eb0 01c31f7c 01c31eb0 badext!HttpExtensionProc+0x5a

02 00b9f770 65d823a2 0209a338 01c32025 01c31eb0 wam!SE_TABLE::ReleaseExtension+0xbe8

*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for RPCRT4.DLL -

03 00b9f7b4 77d339c0 006194c8 00000000 0000009e wam!SE_TABLE::ReleaseExtension+0x484

04 00b9f7dc 77d93570 65d8223f 00b9f7f8 00000005 RPCRT4!NdrServerInitialize+0x288

05 00b9fa54 77d949ac 021c44f0 002116c4 0018a648 RPCRT4!NdrStubCall2+0x570

*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for ole32.dll -

06 00b9fab8 77b29e7f 021c44f0 0018a648 002116c4 RPCRT4!CStdStubBuffer_Invoke+0x9e

07 00b9fafc 77b29d6e 0018a648 021c3074 00224738 ole32!HDC_UserMarshal+0x78a

08 00b9fb44 77aa7ae7 0018a648 021c2ed8 021c44f0 ole32!HDC_UserMarshal+0x679

09 00b9fba8 77aa7a33 002116c4 00000000 021c44f0 ole32!CoGetCallContext+0x401

0a 00b9fbc4 77b29c89 0018a648 00000001 021c44f0 ole32!CoGetCallContext+0x34d

0b 00b9fbf4 77b29a89 0018a600 002116c4 021c44f0 ole32!HDC_UserMarshal+0x594

0c 00b9fcb4 77b2a12c 001a9ef0 00000000 021c3058 ole32!HDC_UserMarshal+0x394

0d 00b9fcf4 77d33721 0018a600 021c3058 021c7ef0 ole32!HDC_UserMarshal+0xa37

0e 00b9fd2c 77d33667 77b29f7b 021c7ef0 00b9fe0c RPCRT4!I_RpcFree+0x1ff

0f 00b9fd84 77d33579 00000000 00000000 00b9fe0c RPCRT4!I_RpcFree+0x145

10 00b9fda4 77d48e81 021c7ef0 00000000 00b9fe0c RPCRT4!I_RpcFree+0x57

11 00b9fdd4 77d34bc6 021c7ef0 021c7eb4 00000000 RPCRT4!RpcSsDestroyClientContext+0xa6

12 00b9fe10 77d346c5 021c7c88 001b6f68 80030001 RPCRT4!NdrCorrelationFree+0x1120

13 00b9fe28 77d422ff 021c7df8 00b9fe50 021c7c88 RPCRT4!NdrCorrelationFree+0xc1f

14 00b9ff74 77d420d9 77d42528 001b6f68 00070000 RPCRT4!NdrConformantArrayMemorySize+0x4c5

15 00b9ffa8 77d424da 001b7220 00b9ffec 77e887dd RPCRT4!NdrConformantArrayMemorySize+0x29f

*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for KERNEL32.DLL -

16 00b9ffb4 77e887dd 001b7278 00070000 01000002 RPCRT4!NdrConformantArrayMemorySize+0x6a0

17 00b9ffec 00000000 77d424c2 001b7278 00000000 KERNEL32!GetModuleFileNameA+0x1d1 ]

 

In this stack backtrace, it is clear that the culprit is "badext.dll". So it is enough to tell the customer to contact the dll vendor to fix it. If it is an in-house component and the customer would like help

from Microsoft, they should open an advisory case to troubleshoot the issue further.

 

b) The regiters values

 

0:001> r eax=00000000 ebx=00000003 ecx=00000000 edx=014fb076 esi=78002041 edi=0209a7d8

eip=06471468 esp=00b9f70c ebp=00b9f70c iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na po nc

cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0038 gs=0000 efl=00000246

badext!HttpExtensionProc+1e3:

06471468 66c700d307 mov word ptr [eax],0x7d3 ds:0023:00000000=????  

 

c) The disassmbly code

 

0:001> u eip

badext!HttpExtensionProc+1e3:

06471468 66c700d307 mov word ptr [eax],0x7d3

0647146d 6a01 push 0x1 0647146f 58 pop eax

06471470 5d pop ebp 06471471 c20800 ret 0x8

06471474 55 push ebp

06471475 8bec mov ebp,esp

06471477 837d0c01 cmp dword ptr [ebp+0xc],0x1

 

2) With symbols including public symbols of "badExt.dll"

 

First, we need to add the symbol path(company wide symbols) as well as symbols of our dll

a) Using the GUI:

- Click "File"

- Click "Symbol File Path"

- Type in SRV*C:\LabSymbols*\\symbols\symbols;C:\IISDebugLabs\symbols\Pub and hit Enter

b) Using the ".sympath+" command:

.sympath+ SRV*C:\LabSymbols*\\symbols\symbols;C :\IISDebugLabs\symbols\Pub

 

The stack backtrace of the thread that AV'd would look like:

 

0:001> kvn50

# ChildEBP RetAddr Args to Child

00 00b9f70c 064712df 01c31eb0 00000001 01c31f7c badext!doAV1+0xb

01 00b9f728 65d82b06 01c31eb0 01c31f7c 01c31eb0 badext!HttpExtensionProc+0x5a

02 00b9f73c 65d82a97 01c31eb0 01c31f7c 01c31eb0 wam!HSE_APPDLL::ExecuteRequest+0x93 (FPO: [1,0,3]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\inet\iis\svcs\wam\object\isplocal.cxx @ 450]

03 00b9f770 65d823a2 0209a338 01c32025 01c31eb0 wam!WAM::InvokeExtension+0x35 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\inet\iis\svcs\wam\object\wamobj.cxx @ 913]

04 00b9f7b4 77d339c0 006194c8 00000000 0000009e wam!WAM::ProcessRequest+0x240 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\inet\iis\svcs\wam\object\wamobj.cxx @ 643]

05 00b9f7dc 77d93570 65d8223f 00b9f7f8 00000005 RPCRT4!Invoke+0x30 [..\i386\stubless.asm @ 88]

06 00b9fa54 77d949ac 021c44f0 002116c4 0018a648 RPCRT4!NdrStubCall2+0x63d (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\ndr20\srvcall.c @ 1724]

07 00b9fab8 77b29e7f 021c44f0 0018a648 002116c4 RPCRT4!CStdStubBuffer_Invoke+0xec (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\ndr20\stub.c @ 1571]

08 00b9fafc 77b29d6e 0018a648 021c3074 00224738 ole32!SyncStubInvoke+0x61 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1136]

09 00b9fb44 77aa7ae7 0018a648 021c2ed8 021c44f0 ole32!StubInvoke+0xa8 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1334]

0a 00b9fba8 77aa7a33 002116c4 00000000 021c44f0 ole32!CCtxComChnl::ContextInvoke+0xbb (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\ctxchnl.cxx @ 1204]

0b 00b9fbc4 77b29c89 0018a648 00000001 021c44f0 ole32!MTAInvoke+0x18 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\callctrl.cxx @ 1952]

0c 00b9fbf4 77b29a89 0018a600 002116c4 021c44f0 ole32!AppInvoke+0xb5 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1013]

0d 00b9fcb4 77b2a12c 001a9ef0 00000000 021c3058 ole32!ComInvokeWithLockAndIPID+0x29e (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1578]

0e 00b9fcf4 77d33721 0018a600 021c3058 021c7ef0 ole32!ThreadInvoke+0x1b7 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 3835]

0f 00b9fd2c 77d33667 77b29f7b 021c7ef0 00b9fe0c RPCRT4!DispatchToStubInC+0x84 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\dispatch.c @ 82]

10 00b9fd84 77d33579 00000000 00000000 00b9fe0c RPCRT4!RPC_INTERFACE::DispatchToStubWorker+0x100 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\hndlsvr.cxx @ 543]

11 00b9fda4 77d48e81 021c7ef0 00000000 00b9fe0c RPCRT4!RPC_INTERFACE::DispatchToStub+0x5e (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\hndlsvr.cxx @ 407]

12 00b9fdd4 77d34bc6 021c7ef0 021c7eb4 00000000 RPCRT4!RPC_INTERFACE::DispatchToStubWithObject+0xa9 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\hndlsvr.cxx @ 795]

13 00b9fe10 77d346c5 021c7c88 001b6f68 80030001 RPCRT4!LRPC_SCALL::DealWithRequestMessage+0x1c6 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\lpcsvr.cxx @ 2665]

14 00b9fe28 77d422ff 021c7df8 00b9fe50 021c7c88 RPCRT4!LRPC_ADDRESS::DealWithLRPCRequest+0x10c (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\lpcsvr.cxx @ 867]

15 00b9ff74 77d420d9 77d42528 001b6f68 00070000 RPCRT4!LRPC_ADDRESS::ReceiveLotsaCalls+0x1eb (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\lpcsvr.cxx @ 1175]

16 00b9ff78 77d42528 001b6f68 00070000 01000002 RPCRT4!RecvLotsaCallsWrapper+0x9 (FPO: [1,0,0]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\lpcsvr.cxx @ 37]

17 00b9ffa8 77d424da 001b7220 00b9ffec 77e887dd RPCRT4!BaseCachedThreadRoutine+0x4f (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\hndlsvr.cxx @ 3586]

18 00b9ffb4 77e887dd 001b7278 00070000 01000002 RPCRT4!ThreadStartRoutine+0x18 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\threads.cxx @ 230]

19 00b9ffec 00000000 77d424c2 001b7278 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadStart+0x52 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\windows\base\client\support.c @ 460]

 

 

 

Now, with the public symbols line up, we see that the last call that AV'd was to the function "doAV1" that was called from the ISAPI extension

entry point "HttpExtensionProc".

 

Again, In this stack backtrace, it is clear that the culprit is "badext.dll". So it is enough to tell the customer to contact the dll vendor to fix it. If it is an in-house component and the customer would like help

from Microsoft, they should open an advisory case to troubleshoot the issue further.

 

Advanced Technique

 

Notice also that the call to our extension was invoked by "wam.dll" (Web Application Manager). It is the component responsible for handing

over any request that needs to be processed by an ISAPI extension.

 

One way to see the http request passed to our extension is to dump the structure of "pWamExecInfo".

 

0:006> .frame 3

03 00b9f770 65d823a2 wam!WAM::InvokeExtension+0x35 [D:\nt\private\inet\iis\svcs\wam\object\wamobj.cxx @ 913]

0:006> dv

this = 0

psExt = 0209a338

szISADllPath = 01c32025 "C:\Inetpub\wwwroot\Dev\badext.dll"

pWamExecInfo = 01c31eb0

ret = 0x6194c8

0:006> dt pWamExecInfo -r

Local var @ 0x136f780 Type WAM_EXEC_INFO*

0x01c31eb0

+0x000 ecb :

+0x000 cbSize : 0x90

+0x004 dwVersion : 0x40000

+0x008 ConnID : 0x01c31eb0

+0x00c dwHttpStatusCode : 0xc8

+0x010 lpszLogData : [80] ""

+0x060 lpszMethod : 0x01c32010 "GET"

+0x064 lpszQueryString : 0x01c32047 "s=av1_v1"

+0x068 lpszPathInfo : 0x01c31ffc ""

+0x06c lpszPathTranslated : 0x01c31ffd "c:\inetpub\wwwroot"

+0x070 cbTotalBytes : 0

+0x074 cbAvailable : 0

+0x078 lpbData : (null)

+0x07c lpszContentType : 0x01c32014 ""

+0x080 GetServerVariable : 0x65d815df wam!GetServerVariable+0

+0x084 WriteClient : 0x65d88484 wam!WriteClient+0

+0x088 ReadClient : 0x65d8861f wam!ReadClient+0

+0x08c ServerSupportFunction : 0x65d81d61 wam!ServerSupportFunction+0

+0x090 m_pIWamReqIIS : 0x001aa40c

.....

.....

.....

 

To verify that the symbols are lined up properly for our extension, issue this command.

 

0:006> lmv mbadext

start end module name 06470000 06475000

badext (pdb symbols) C :\IISDebugLabs\symbols\Pub

Loaded symbol image file: C:\IISDebuglabs\www\App\badext.dll Image path: C:\IISDebuglabs\www\App\badext.dll

Timestamp: Wed Jan 29 18:07:14 2003 (3E385EA2)

Checksum: 0000EBCD

File version: 5.0.0.0

Product version: 5.0.0.0

File flags: 0 (Mask 3F)

File OS: 40004 NT Win32

File type: 2.0 Dll

File date: 00000000.00000000

CompanyName: Microsoft Corporation

ProductName: Internet Information Services

InternalName: badEXT.dll

OriginalFilename: badEXT.dll

ProductVersion: 5.00.0984

FileVersion: 5.00.0984

FileDescription: badEXT Test

LegalCopyright: Copyright (C) Microsoft Corp. 1981-1999

 

3) with Private Symbols "badExt.dll"

 

First, we need to add the symbol path(company wide symbols) as well as private symbols of our dll

a) Using the GUI:

- Click "File"

- Click "Symbol File Path"

- Type in SRV*C:\LabSymbols*\\symbols\symbols;C:\IISDebugLabs\symbols\Pri and hit Enter

b) Using the ".sympath+" command:

.sympath+ SRV*C:\LabSymbols*\\symbols\symbols;C :\IISDebugLabs\symbols\Pri

 

 

The stack backtrace of the thread that AV'd would look like:

 

0:001> kvn50

# ChildEBP RetAddr Args to Child

00 00b9f70c 064712df 01c31eb0 00000001 01c31f7c badext!doAV1+0xb (CONV: stdcall) [H:\nT\PRIVATE\inet\iis\svcs\w3\gateways\extDBG\badext.cpp @ 147]

01 00b9f728 65d82b06 01c31eb0 01c31f7c 01c31eb0 badext!HttpExtensionProc+0x5a (CONV: stdcall) [H:\nT\PRIVATE\inet\iis\svcs\w3\gateways\extDBG\badext.cpp @ 82]

02 00b9f73c 65d82a97 01c31eb0 01c31f7c 01c31eb0 wam!HSE_APPDLL::ExecuteRequest+0x93 (FPO: [1,0,3]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\inet\iis\svcs\wam\object\isplocal.cxx @ 450]

03 00b9f770 65d823a2 0209a338 01c32025 01c31eb0 wam!WAM::InvokeExtension+0x35 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\inet\iis\svcs\wam\object\wamobj.cxx @ 913]

04 00b9f7b4 77d339c0 006194c8 00000000 0000009e wam!WAM::ProcessRequest+0x240 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\inet\iis\svcs\wam\object\wamobj.cxx @ 643]

05 00b9f7dc 77d93570 65d8223f 00b9f7f8 00000005 RPCRT4!Invoke+0x30 [..\i386\stubless.asm @ 88]

06 00b9fa54 77d949ac 021c44f0 002116c4 0018a648 RPCRT4!NdrStubCall2+0x63d (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\ndr20\srvcall.c @ 1724]

07 00b9fab8 77b29e7f 021c44f0 0018a648 002116c4 RPCRT4!CStdStubBuffer_Invoke+0xec (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\ndr20\stub.c @ 1571]

08 00b9fafc 77b29d6e 0018a648 021c3074 00224738 ole32!SyncStubInvoke+0x61 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1136]

09 00b9fb44 77aa7ae7 0018a648 021c2ed8 021c44f0 ole32!StubInvoke+0xa8 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1334]

0a 00b9fba8 77aa7a33 002116c4 00000000 021c44f0 ole32!CCtxComChnl::ContextInvoke+0xbb (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\ctxchnl.cxx @ 1204]

0b 00b9fbc4 77b29c89 0018a648 00000001 021c44f0 ole32!MTAInvoke+0x18 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\callctrl.cxx @ 1952]

0c 00b9fbf4 77b29a89 0018a600 002116c4 021c44f0 ole32!AppInvoke+0xb5 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1013]

0d 00b9fcb4 77b2a12c 001a9ef0 00000000 021c3058 ole32!ComInvokeWithLockAndIPID+0x29e (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1578]

0e 00b9fcf4 77d33721 0018a600 021c3058 021c7ef0 ole32!ThreadInvoke+0x1b7 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\ole32\com\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 3835]

0f 00b9fd2c 77d33667 77b29f7b 021c7ef0 00b9fe0c RPCRT4!DispatchToStubInC+0x84 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\dispatch.c @ 82]

10 00b9fd84 77d33579 00000000 00000000 00b9fe0c RPCRT4!RPC_INTERFACE::DispatchToStubWorker+0x100 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\hndlsvr.cxx @ 543]

11 00b9fda4 77d48e81 021c7ef0 00000000 00b9fe0c RPCRT4!RPC_INTERFACE::DispatchToStub+0x5e (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\hndlsvr.cxx @ 407]

12 00b9fdd4 77d34bc6 021c7ef0 021c7eb4 00000000 RPCRT4!RPC_INTERFACE::DispatchToStubWithObject+0xa9 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\hndlsvr.cxx @ 795]

13 00b9fe10 77d346c5 021c7c88 001b6f68 80030001 RPCRT4!LRPC_SCALL::DealWithRequestMessage+0x1c6 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\lpcsvr.cxx @ 2665]

14 00b9fe28 77d422ff 021c7df8 00b9fe50 021c7c88 RPCRT4!LRPC_ADDRESS::DealWithLRPCRequest+0x10c (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\lpcsvr.cxx @ 867]

15 00b9ff74 77d420d9 77d42528 001b6f68 00070000 RPCRT4!LRPC_ADDRESS::ReceiveLotsaCalls+0x1eb (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: thiscall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\lpcsvr.cxx @ 1175]

16 00b9ff78 77d42528 001b6f68 00070000 01000002 RPCRT4!RecvLotsaCallsWrapper+0x9 (FPO: [1,0,0]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\lpcsvr.cxx @ 37]

17 00b9ffa8 77d424da 001b7220 00b9ffec 77e887dd RPCRT4!BaseCachedThreadRoutine+0x4f (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\hndlsvr.cxx @ 3586]

18 00b9ffb4 77e887dd 001b7278 00070000 01000002 RPCRT4!ThreadStartRoutine+0x18 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\rpc\runtime\mtrt\threads.cxx @ 230]

19 00b9ffec 00000000 77d424c2 001b7278 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadStart+0x52 (FPO: [Non-Fpo]) (CONV: stdcall) [D:\nt\private\windows\base\client\support.c @ 460]

 

 

Notice in frame OO and 01 the line of the code as well as the name and location of the source code. Going back to the source code in badext.cpp:

 

Line 82 looks like

 

DWORD WINAPI HttpExtensionProc(EXTENSION_CONTROL_BLOCK *lpEcb)

{

.....

.....

if (!strncmp(szS, "av1", 3))

{

return doAV1(lpEcb, 1); //Line 82

}

.....

.....

}

 

Line 147 looks like

 

DWORD doAV1(EXTENSION_CONTROL_BLOCK *lpEcb, int Variation)

{

if (1 == Variation)

{

SYSTEMTIME* pSysTime = NULL;

pSysTime->wYear = 2003; // Line 147: av right here.

}

return HSE_STATUS_SUCCESS;

}

 

 

 


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